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This paper addresses the question of what determines a poor credit score.  We compare estimated 
credit scores with measures of impulsivity, time preference, risk attitude and trustworthiness, in 
an effort to determine the preferences that underlie credit behavior.  Data are collected using an 
incentivized decision making lab experiment, together with financial and psychological surveys.  
Credit scores are estimated using an online FICO credit score estimator based on survey data 
supplied by the participants.  Preferences are assessed using a survey measure of impulsivity, 
with experimental measures of time and risk preferences, as well as trustworthiness.  Controlling 
for income differences, we find that the credit score is correlated with measures of impulsivity, 
time preference, and trustworthiness.   
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Anatomy of the Credit Score 
1. Introduction 
 Credit scoring has become an increasingly popular topic in recent years—in the media, in 
business, and at the dinner table.  In these days of easy access to information, a negative credit 
event such as a mortgage default or bankruptcy can haunt a consumer for a considerable period 
of time.  A credit score is a number that represents an assessment of the creditworthiness of a 
person, or the likelihood that the person will repay his or her debts. Credit scores are generated 
based on the statistical analysis of a person’s credit report; credit bureaus such as Experian, 
Equifax and TransUnion maintain a record of a person’s borrowing and repaying activities.    
 The Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) developed the formula used by all three major credit 
reporting agencies in the U.S.  The algorithm is kept secret, but most believe that it is based upon 
the ratio of debt to available credit; this denominator, in most cases, is a direct function of 
income.  The score is then adjusted for payment history, number of recent credit applications, 
and negative events such as bankruptcy/foreclosure, as well as changes in income caused by 
changes in employment or family status.  
 In addition to its original purpose, credit scores are also used to determine insurance rates 
and for pre-employment screening. Employers as well as lenders use credit reports and scores to 
gain insight into the records and tendencies of prospective employees, making the assumption 
that credit scores correlate with general trustworthiness.  There is even a dating website, 
creditscoredating.com, that purports to match subscribers with high-score partners.  With reports 
and scores available to the public for little or no cost, the FICO score has become a part of the 
dating and mating process:  along with a criminal background check, a credit report reveals much 
about a person’s personality and behavioral tendencies… or does it? 
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The repayment of debt is contingent upon two factors: the ability to pay the debt, and the 
borrower’s willingness to pay.  The first condition is largely determined by income, while the 
second is more psychological in nature. Debtors may choose to pay their balances and reduce 
funds available to spend on other items, or default on their loans and keep their current level of 
liquidity, accruing penalties and credit bruises in the process. 
  Our study seeks to find which, if any, underlying preferences or personality factors 
contribute to the credit score.  We consider four factors: impatience, impulsiveness, risk 
tolerance, and trustworthiness.  It seems reasonable to expect lower credit scores to be associated 
with greater discounting of future payoffs: that is, impatience is associated with a desire to move 
consumption toward the present from the future by borrowing, and higher borrowing implies a 
higher probability of default.  Impulsive individuals are likely to have difficulty resisting the 
temptation to borrow for present consumption, and more likely to fail to pay their debts.  Poor 
credit scores could also be caused by a lack of trustworthiness, as the less trustworthy fail to 
meet their obligations.  And finally, credit scores could be impacted significantly by financial 
risk-taking, as those who gamble accumulate debt that they have difficulty repaying. 
 In this study we estimate credit scores using an online FICO estimator, based on 
information reported by the subjects.  These estimated credit scores are compared with 
incentivized measures of risk attitudes, trustworthiness, and time preference, and a survey 
measure of impulsivity.  Our purpose is to determine the behavioral correlates of credit behavior 
reflected by credit scores.  We find that measures of impatience, trustworthiness and impulsivity 
have an impact on the credit score. 
2.  Related Literature  
 There is little prior research on the determinants of credit scores, and few studies 
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explicitly link credit scores to the above mentioned correlates of behavior. A number of studies, 
however, examine the role of preferences in consumer financial decisions.   
Preferences that are elicited using incentivized tasks are correlated with self-reported 
credit-related decisions by several researchers.  Harrison et al. (2002) find no relationship 
between individual discount rates and borrowing behavior in a sample of Danish adults, while 
Dohment et al. (2006) find a significant relationship between present-biased preferences and 
self-reported financial difficulties.  Both studies rely on self-reported financial information.  
Eckel et al. (2007) show that patience and risk tolerance are positively related to consumer 
decisions to borrow for the purpose of investing in post-secondary education.  That study utilizes 
a sample of about 1000 Canadian adults, and elicits risk and time preferences along with 
information about the decision to borrow for post-secondary education.1 
Meier and Sprenger (2010) show that individual time preference is a determining factor 
in credit card borrowing.  They elicit time preferences from a sample of about 600 low- and 
moderate-income individuals, and (with their permission) directly access their credit reports and 
tax returns.  Preference data are then correlated with administrative data, providing a distinct 
improvement on previous studies.  They find that, while an individual’s elicited discount factor is 
not significantly related to credit card borrowing, their present bias is an important explanatory 
factor, with stronger present bias associated with greater borrowing, controlling for a variety of 
demographic and situational variables.  Our study is closely related to theirs, except that we add 
incentivized measures of risk attitudes and trustworthiness, but replace the incentivized present-
bias measure with a survey assessment of impulsiveness. 
 Several studies have shown a relationship between trust or trustworthiness and credit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In a related paper, Eckel et al. (2004) show that short-term elicited discount rates are highly correlated with long-
term (five-year) discount rates, though the long term rates involve less discounting of future payoffs on average.   
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decisions.  The earliest of these is Karlan (2005), who found that trustworthiness in the trust 
game (developed by Berg et al. 1995) predicts loan repayment in a Peruvian group lending 
microfinance program. (See also Karlan 2007).  Cassar et al. (2007) examine the effect of 
various elements of social capital, including interpersonal trust and trustworthiness (in the trust 
game used here), on microfinance loan repayment (in a “microfinance game”) among two groups 
of subjects in South Africa and Armenia.  They fail to find a significant effect of trustworthiness 
in the game on loan repayment in South Africa, but observe a very strong positive relationship in 
Armenia.   
 Ausubel (1999) reports the results of a large-scale field experiment testing the effects of 
different credit card offers.  He draws three conclusions from the study.  First, respondents to 
credit card solicitations were significantly higher credit risks than non-respondents.  Secondly, 
solicitations offering inferior terms attracted higher-risk borrowers.  Third, even after controlling 
for all of the information available to the credit card company, consumers who accepted such 
unfavorable terms exhibited a higher likelihood of default.  This suggests that characteristics that 
are not considered by the credit card companies may play an important role in predicting those 
who will default on their credit commitments.  We argue that these may consist of preferences 
and personality factors, such as time and risk preferences, trustworthiness and impulsiveness. 
 These variables may be related to each other: Martins et al. (2004) show that impulsivity 
is related to risk taking by gamblers. The study was conducted on seventy-eight female and male 
pathological gamblers who were compared on a profile of risk taking behaviors which included 
suicide attempts, illegal activities meant to finance gambling, sexual risky behavior, and alcohol 
abuse.   
 Taken together these studies provide some evidence of the impact of preferences on 
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financial decision making.  Time discounting, assessed using incentivized choice or valuation 
experiments, plays a role in several studies involving credit or savings, and time-inconsistency, 
in the form of present-biased decision making in similar incentivized games is also important and 
appears to play a separate role from time discounting alone.  Present bias is akin to 
impulsiveness, so it is not surprising that impulsivity is also related to poor credit choices.  
Finally, trustworthiness, as measured by the second stage of the trust game, corresponds with 
good credit behavior, as represented by repayment and low default rates on microfinance loans.                                                               
3.  Research Design and Procedure 
The experiment contained modules used to assess credit scores, impulsivity, time and risk 
preferences, and trustworthiness.  Each of these is explained in turn.  The design consisted of a 
survey plus four incentivized tasks/games.  The stakes for these tasks was set to be relatively 
high.  At the end of the experiment, one of the tasks was selected randomly, and all subjects were 
paid in cash for their decisions on that task.   
Credit scores were estimated using the FICO credit score estimator (www.myfico.com), 
an internet based tool that provides a credit score range based on self-reported financial 
information. We incorporated the questions from the online estimator into a survey that was 
completed by the subjects.  These responses were then entered into the website by the 
researchers to obtain the credit score estimate.  Two researchers separately made all website 
entries and recorded the resulting scores; discrepancies were then reconciled.2   
Impulsivity was assessed using a widely-adopted psychological survey measure, the 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11, Patton et al. 1995). This scale consists of several subscales, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A more accurate approach would be to use the subjects’ actual credit scores.  However, this proved cumbersome 
and costly.  In order to obtain an official credit score, an individual must register for – and provide credit card 
information to pay for – a firm’s credit service.  While this service can subsequently be cancelled at no net cost, we 
felt it was overly invasive and demanding to request that subjects complete such a procedure.  
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attention (5 items), motor (7 items), self-control (6 items), cognitive complexity (5 items), 
perseverance (4 items) and cognitive instability (3 items).  We collected the full scale, and 
analysis was conducted using that as well as the self-control subscale, which, according to the 
original study, is most relevant to financial decision making.3   
Risk preferences are elicited using the measure in Eckel and Grossman (2008).  To 
complete this task, subjects choose the one they most prefer from among six possible 50/50 
gambles.  These gambles are shown in Figure 1 and described in Table 1.  The first gamble earns 
the subject 20 with certainty.  The gambles increase in risk and expected value through the fifth 
gamble.  The sixth involves a possible loss, and consists of an increase in variance only, with the 
same expected value as the fifth gamble.  The choice of gamble implies a level of risk tolerance; 
Table 1 also shows ranges for the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) associated with 
each choice, under the assumption that the subject’s utility function is of that form.  This 
measure has been used in a number of studies in the lab and the field, and is easily understood by 
subjects.  If this task was chosen for payment, the subjects were asked to roll a six-sided die. A 
roll of 1,2,3 gave them the lower payoff for their chosen gamble, whereas a roll of 4,5,6 gave 
them the higher payoff. 
Time preferences are elicited using a variation on the ‘multiple price list’ approach of 
Coller and Williams (1999), as modified for use in the field.  Subjects make a sequence of seven 
choices between $100 in one week and larger amounts of money in six months plus a week; 
subjects also had the option to choose “indifferent”, in which case the experimenter rolled a die 
to determine which of the alternatives to select.  The decision screen is shown in Figure 2. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Note that it would be possible to elicit impulsiveness using incentivized games, but to our knowledge, all such 
protocols tend to be complex and involve a large number of decisions.  Our strategy was to focus on simple 
measures of preferences, and the psychological measure was appealing for its simplicity and ease of administration.  
Jorm et al 1997 explore its validity in a community sample.  We are unaware of any studies that validate the 
measure in the context of an incentivized decision-making experiment. 
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Subjects typically choose the smaller, sooner payment for the first few decisions, and then switch 
at some point to the larger later amount.  Care was taken to schedule the experiments so that 
students were likely to be on campus for the later payment date. If this task was chosen for 
payment the participants could choose to pick up their payment at the conveniently-located 
experiment lab at a designated time or provide a mailing address to which it could be sent. If this 
task was chosen for payment, participants rolled a seven-sided die to determine which decision 
they would be paid for.  If they checked ‘indifferent’ in the decision they were to be paid for, 
then a coin was flipped in order to determine a sooner or later payoff date.  
Trustworthiness was evaluated using the trust game task (Berg, Dickaut and McCabe 
1995).  In this game two persons are randomly and anonymously matched, and both are endowed 
with 20 tokens.  The first mover can send any amount from 0 to 20 in increments of 2 to the 
second mover.   The amount sent is multiplied by three on the way and then deposited in the 
second-mover’s account. The second mover can then choose how many tokens (from the ones 
received and the initial endowment) to send back to the proposer. These tokens returned are not 
multiplied.  
In order to elicit responses in this game we employed the strategy method. This means 
that each player played as the proposer and responder. As the proposer they could choose what 
amount to send. Sending amounts in increments of two implies that they could send 0, 2, 
4,6,8,10,12,14,16,18 and 20. For the responder we collected responses to each possible amount 
that he could receive: 0, 6, 12, 18, 24, 30, 36, 42, 48, 54 and 60. If this task was chosen for 
payment the participants were randomly divided into two groups, the proposers and the 
responders.  They were then matched randomly and paid according to the decisions made for 
these respective roles. (Before starting the experiment we made sure we had an even number of 
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participants).  
The tasks and games were explained using experimental dollars, and at the end of the 
session one of these three tasks was randomly chosen for payment at a conversion rate of 1 
experimental dollar =50 U.S. cents. 
A total of 79 subjects were recruited from evening graduate courses and staff email lists 
in order to obtain data from older subjects who were more likely to have a job and a meaningful 
credit history.  Of these, 66 gave responses that allowed us to estimate a credit score; the 
remaining observations were dropped due to missing credit information. Three additional outlier 
observations with estimated scores in the 500-550 range were dropped because of a very recent 
negative event (bankruptcy, foreclosure, divorce, etc.)  This is explained further below. 
Prior to making their respective decisions, the participants were informed of the 
confidentiality of the data. The experiment was conducted electronically and all the tasks and 
surveys were programmed in z-tree (Fishbacher 2007). The experiment started off with a 
financial survey, followed by the impulsivity survey.  The subjects then completed the trust task, 
gamble task and time preference task.  Before each task, the participants had to complete self-
paced instructions and a short quiz in order to ensure their understanding of the tasks.  This was 
followed by an exit demographic survey.   One task was chosen randomly to determine payment 
for all subjects, and payment took place in private.    
4. Data Analysis  
4.1 Hypotheses  
Our hypotheses about the effects of the variables on the FICO score are summarized here. 
Patience is measured as the number of times the subject chooses the larger, later payment 
in the time preference task, and is expected to correlate positively with the FICO score. The more 
9	  
	  
patient an individual, the more likely it is that he/she will forgo present consumption to achieve 
an expected higher level of well-being in the future. Patient subjects may opt to borrow less, and 
rather save and make cash purchases to avoid paying interest.  If and when they do borrow, 
patient subjects would be likely to look for favorable interest rates, and spend carefully in order 
to have funds available to repay the loan, thereby generating a high credit score. 
Impulsiveness implies a lack of self-control and discipline, and this measure is expected 
to correlate negatively with the estimated FICO score.  Impulsivity is measured using the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11). Impulsive financial decisions could lead to excessive debt without 
available means to pay it off.  Let us take a moment to delineate the difference between impatient 
and impulsive behavior.  Essentially, the impatient decision is a calculated one, in which, for the 
decision maker, the benefit obtained from imminent consumption outweighs the benefit obtained 
by waiting to consume later, even if the future benefit is ultimately more valuable than the 
imminent one. (See the survey in Frederick and Loewenstein 2002.)  Impulsive consumers are 
more likely to make purchases on a whim without any consideration of future obligations.  This 
behavior can be distinguished even in young children (Shoda and Mischel 1990).  Economists 
have suggested the prevalence of present bias (hyperbolic discounting) in many consumers, 
which seems related to impulsivity (Angletos et al. 2001).   
Risk Preference is defined as a subject’s level of risk-tolerance, as measured by an 
incentivized choice task.  Here a subject chooses their most preferred from six gambles that vary 
in expected value and variance, and range from a sure thing to a 50/50 gamble with a possibility 
of losses.  We expect a positive relationship between willingness to take financial risks in this 
context and credit behavior, leading to a positive correlation with the FICO score.  This is 
perhaps clearest when imagining gamblers, who are likely to make decisions that lead to poor 
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credit scores.  While modest risk-taking can increase income and credit scores, more extreme 
risk-taking is likely to be harmful. 
Trustworthiness is measured using the second mover decision in the Trust Game, and is 
expected to have significant positive correlation with the estimated FICO score. Untrustworthy 
behavior could play a role in producing an unfavorable credit score, and paying debt in a timely 
manner is imperative to maintaining a healthy credit score. We are particularly interested in the 
behavior of subjects when they are trusted with a large fraction of the first-mover’s endowment.  
In this situation second movers are left holding a large amount of money, and the temptation to 
keep it is highest.   
Income is an important control variable: Higher income should directly correlate with a 
high FICO score. Income is the basis for credit limit which is central in calculating the score.  
4.2 Results 
 We first discuss each of the preference measures and their correlation with the credit 
score.  Table 2 contains descriptive statistics and Figures 3-8 show histograms of the key 
variables in the study.  Table 3 contains correlations among the variables.  Two-tailed 
significance tests are reported in this table; given the hypotheses above, one-tailed tests arguably 
are appropriate and would strengthen the statistical significance of the results. 
A histogram of estimated FICO scores is shown in Figure 3, revealing a distribution with 
a mean of 708, and a range of about 600 to 800.  FICO credit scores are calculated on a scale 
from 300 - 850, with 850 the maximum possible score.  Since we draw from a sample of 
university students and employees, the average is somewhat above the national average of 680.  
In general, a good credit score is anything above 700. 
 The patience task was presented as a series of choices between a smaller, sooner payoff 
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versus a larger, later payoff. Recall that the sooner payoff was a week from the date of the 
experiment and the later payoff was a week and six months from that day. Subjects could check 
the second column if they were indifferent between the two choices. The patience score was 
calculated as the number of patient (larger, later) choices, with indifferent scored as 0.5 of a 
patient response. Figure 4 shows the patience histogram, which ranges from 0-7 with a mode at 
4.  As shown in Table 3, this variable is positively correlated with the FICO score (p<.10).   
Figure 5 illustrates the Self-Control subscale of the Barratt Impulsivity Scale, where a 
high score indicates a low level of self-control. The full scale consists of a set of 30 questions 
(items) that measure general impulsivity. The 30 questions can be sub-divided into six subscales.  
We were most interested in self-control since it relates most closely to the event of acquiring 
debt.  People who cannot control their desires and who seek immediate gratification are more 
likely to build unsustainable debt levels.  In Table 3, we see that the correlation between the self-
control subscale and the FICO score is negative and statistically significant (p<.05), consistent 
with our hypothesis. 
Elicited risk preferences are illustrated in Figure 6.  The histogram shows the percentage 
of participants that chose each gamble. Recall that the risk task presented a choice between six 
50/50 gambles with a low and high payoff. A choice of a higher gamble number indicates a 
lower level of risk aversion or greater willingness to take risks.  A risk-neutral person would 
choose Gamble 5, and only risk-takers should prefer Gamble 6.  The modal gamble chosen is 3, 
which has a modest level of risk.  Using the gamble number as a scale of risk tolerance, we see 
that this is negatively, but not significantly, correlated with the FICO score in Table 3 (p=.83), 
which is not consistent with the hypothesis above.   
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As a proxy for trustworthiness, we use the percent returned by the subject in the second 
mover role at the maximum level of trust, focusing on the decision made when the amount sent 
was the maximum amount of 20.  In our analysis we explored several ways of coding the 
strategy-method data, and settled on the range of amounts sent that represent the most tempting 
situation for the responder, the most extreme decision – the amount sent of 20 tokens.  This 
meant that the responder had 20*3=60 tokens ($30) deposited in their account. (Similar results 
are obtained when we use the slope of the second mover’s response function, or the average 
response for amounts sent above 10 tokens.)  The distribution of this variable is shown in Figure 
7.  Trustworthiness when trust is highest is strongly positively correlated with the FICO score, as 
shown in Table 3 (p<.005). 
Finally, Figure 8 illustrates the income distribution of the subjects.  The subjects were asked 
what income bracket they fell into. The choices were as follows; -$0 to $5000; $5001 to $10000;  
$10001-$20000; $20001-$40000; above $40000. As we can see, since many of the recruits were 
college students, a high proportion of subjects fell into the $0-$5000 income bracket, although 
subjects are represented in each of the categories.  Income is also strongly correlated with the 
FICO score (p<.005).   
4.3 Regression Analysis  
In order to further test our hypotheses, we conduct OLS regressions, reported in Table 4.  
The dependent variable is the FICO score and the independent variables are patience (denoted as 
time preference in the model), self-control from the BIS-11(coded as No Self-Control), risk 
attitude (denoted as risk), trustworthiness, income, age, and gender.  Model 1 includes the 
experimental variables and income.  As predicted, all the signs are in the hypothesized direction. 
Patience and impulsivity (as measured by lack of self-control) are significant at p<.10 (two-tailed 
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test).  Income and trustworthiness are significant with p<.05 (two-tailed test).4   
The second model adds age and gender to the regression. Refer Table 2. The qualitative 
results are robust to these additions, except that adding age causes income to lose statistical 
significance. This is due to the fact that income and age are highly correlated.  Gender does not 
have a significant effect on the FICO score.   
The model is also robust to alternative specifications.  Dropping risk aversion leaves the 
remaining coefficients relatively unchanged.5  A further consideration is that income may be 
seen as endogenous to preferences.  We conduct two additional tests to explore this possibility.    
First, dropping income from the regressions lowers the significance level of time preference in 
Model 1 (to p=0.12), but increases the significance of the other variables.  Dropping both risk 
and income leaves the remaining coefficients at similar magnitudes and significance levels.  In a 
second test, we regress income on the preference measures.  Risk, time, and impulsivity are 
unrelated to income (p>.5).  However, trustworthiness is positive and significant at p<0.01, 
confirming the correlations in Table 3.  Dropping it from the regression does not affect the 
magnitude or significance of the other variables.  While in our data the complex effect of income 
cannot be fully isolated, nevertheless, whether or not we control for income, there is substantial 
evidence of the importance of the preference variables. 
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
The results suggest that, in addition to the important effect of income, there are certain 
behavioral factors that are correlates of credit scores. These behaviors include impulsivity, time 
preference (or future orientation), and trustworthiness. Risk attitude was not statistically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Recall that three outliers in the FICO scores in the range of 510-550 were dropped from the analysis.  Similar 
results are obtained if these three observations are included, but including them introduces heteroskedasticity in the 
model, making statistical inference problematic.     
5	  Note the coefficients and significance on the remaining variables are unaffected by dropping the risk variable from 
the analysis.  Additional specifications discussed in this paragraph are available from the authors on request.	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significantly related to credit score, suggesting that a preference for risk-taking is not an 
important source of variability in credit scores, and dropping it from the regression does not 
affect the magnitude or significance of the other variables.  Our results build upon those of Meier 
and Sprenger (2010), but add the key measures of impulsivity and trustworthiness. These two 
variables are significantly correlated with the credit score, and add additional explanatory power 
to the model.  We believe that with more observations, a more varied sample, and the more 
precise measure provided by actual (instead of estimated) FICO scores, these relationships can 
be explored in more detail.  That is, more precise measures will reduce “noise” in the credit score 
measure, and a larger more variable sample will enhance variability in both credit history and 
demographics. 
The FICO score captures elements of preferences or personality that affect credit behavior, 
apart from the obvious effect of income.  It is not too much of a stretch to say that the use of 
FICO scores for employment screening or on dating websites might after all be a useful 
technique for selecting applicants (or potential partners) who are likely to be less impulsive, 
more trustworthy, and more future-oriented.  However, further study is needed to show whether 
credit score adds additional information over and above income for predicting impatient, 
impulsive, or untrustworthy behavior in other domains. 
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Figure 1: Risk Measure:  Subjects are asked to choose one from among the six gambles shown 
below, and the chosen gamble is played out to determine payoffs.  These 50/50 gambles vary in 
risk and expected value, from 20 with certainty to a 50/50 chance of gaining 59 or losing 2.   
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Figure 2: Time Preference Measure: Subjects were asked to check the desired box corresponding 
to payment sooner vs. payment later for each of the 7 choices.  One was selected randomly for 
payment. 
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Figure 3: Histogram Estimated FICO Scores (n=63) 
 
                                                     FICO Results 
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Figure 4:  Histogram and Summary of Time Preference Task 
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Figure 5: Histogram of Barratt Impulsivity Scale (Self Control Subscale) 
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Figure 6: Histogram of Risk Task 
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Figure 7: Histogram and Summary of Trustworthiness When 20 Tokens Were Sent 
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Figure 8: Histogram and Summary of Income 
 
 
 
Categories are as follows: 1-$0 to $5000; 2- $5001 to $10000; 3-$10001-$20000; 4-$20001-
$40000; 5-above $40000. 
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Table 1: Gamble Options 
(Subjects	  choose	  one	  of	  the	  six	  gambles	  represented	  below	  to	  play)	  
Choice	  
(50/50	  Gamble)	  
Low	  	  
Payoff	  
High	  	  
Payoff	  
Expected	  	  
Return	  
Standard	  	  
Deviation	  
Implied	  CRRA*	  	  
Range	  
Fraction	  of	  	  
Subjects	  (%)	  
Gamble	  1	   20	   20	   20	   0	   2<	  r	   22.22	  
Gamble	  2	   16	   28	   22	   6	   .67	  <	  r	  <	  2	   12.70	  
Gamble	  3	   12	   36	   24	   12	   0.38<	  r	  <	  0.67	   33.33	  
Gamble	  4	   8	   44	   26	   18	   0.20<	  r	  <	  0.38	   6.35	  
Gamble	  5	   4	   52	   28	   24	   0	  <	  r	  <	  0.20	   19.05	  
Gamble	  6	   -­‐2	   58	   28	   30	   r	  <	  0	   6.35	  
*Coefficient	  of	  relative	  risk	  aversion,	  assuming	  the	  subject’s	  utility	  function	  takes	  this	  form.	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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable	  	   Obs.	   Mean	  
Std.	  
Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
FICO	   63	   708.49	   41.57	   600	   795	  
Time	  Preference	   63	   4.08	   1.58	   0	   7	  
Risk	   63	   3.06	   1.56	   1	   6	  
No	  Self-­‐Control	   63	   11.25	   2.81	   6	   21	  
Income*	   63	   2.67	   1.59	   1	   5	  
Trustworthiness	   63	   21.87	   18.39	   0	   80	  
Age	   63	   27.30	   8.75	   18	   60	  
Male	   63	   0.40	   0.49	   0	   1	  
Female	   63	   0.60	   0.49	   0	   1	  
 
*Categories are as follows: 1-$0 to $5000; 2-  $5000 to $10000; 3-$10000-$20000; 4-$20000-
$40000; 5- above $40000. 
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Table 3: Pair-wise Correlations (p-values in parentheses) 
. 
	  	  
Est.	  FICO	  
score	  
Time	  
Pref.	  	  
Gamble	  
Choice	  
No	  Self	  
Control	   Income	  
Trust-­‐
worthiness	   Age	  
Time	  Preference	   0.210†	   1.000	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
	  	   (0.099)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Risk	   -­‐0.027	   0.109	   1.000	  
	   	   	  
	  
	  	   (0.834)	   (0.397)	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
No	  Self-­‐Control	   -­‐0.279*	   -­‐0.092	   0.088	   1.000	  
	   	  
	  
	  	   (0.027)	   (0.475)	   (0.492)	  
	   	   	  
	  
Income	   0.387**	   -­‐0.034	   -­‐0.056	   -­‐0.100	   1.000	  
	  
	  
	  	   (0.002)	   (0.790)	   (0.661)	   (0.434)	  
	   	  
	  
Trustworthiness	   0.369**	   -­‐0.001	   -­‐0.288**	   -­‐0.134	   0.359**	   1.000	   	  
	  (for	  sent	  =	  20)	   (0.003)	   (0.994)	   (0.022)	   (0.296)	   (0.004)	  
	  
	  
Age	   0.381**	   0.032	   -­‐0.137	   -­‐0.030	   0.594**	   0.247†	   1.000	  
	  	   (0.002)	   (0.804)	   (0.285)	   (0.819)	   0.000	   (0.052)	  
	  Female	   0.136	   0.042	   -­‐0.180	   0.008	   0.151	   0.185	   0.077	  
	  	   (0.288)	   (0.746)	   (0.159)	   (0.953)	   (0.237)	   (0.146)	   (0.551)	  
 
Significance:	  †,	  p	  ≤	  .10;	  *,	  p	  ≤	  .05,	  **,	  p≤.0	  1	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Table	  4:	  Credit Score Determinants, OLS Regression 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
FICO	  Score	   MODEL	  I	   	  	   MODEL	  II	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Time	  Preference	   5.114	   †	   4.584	   	  	  
	  	   (2.942)	   	  	   (2.934)	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Risk	   1.592	   	  	   2.545	   	  	  
	  	   (3.103)	   	  	   (3.141)	   	  	  
	  	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
No	  Self-­‐Control	   -­‐3.011	   †	   -­‐3.223	   †	  
	  	   (1.669)	   	  	   (1.660)	   	  	  
	  	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
Income	   7.459	   *	   3.667	   	  	  
	  	   (3.121)	   	  	   (3.789)	   	  	  
	  	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
Trustworthiness	   0.582	   *	   0.563	   *	  
	  	   (0.281)	   	  	   (0.280)	   	  	  
	  	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
Age	   	  	   	  	   1.105	   †	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   (0.657)	   	  	  
	  	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
Female	   	  	   	  	   5.257	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   (9.589)	   	  	  
	  	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
Constant	   684.00	   **	   663.90	   **	  
	  	   (27.210)	   	  	   (29.340)	   	  	  
	  	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
N	   63	   	  	   63	   	  	  
R2	   0.301	   	  	   0.338	   	  	  
Adjusted	  R2	   0.240	   	  	   0.254	   	  	  
                        
Significance:	  †,	  p	  ≤	  .10;	  *,	  p	  ≤	  .05,	  **,	  p≤.0	  1	  
 
	  
	  
